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DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN 
ACTION.
By Joseph L. Sax. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1971. Pp. xxv &
252. $6.95.
Joseph Sax has the reputation of being the strongest writer on
environmental law in the country-and with good reason. His 
articles
on the police power' and the public trust doctrine
2 are definitive
works in the field. In his new book, Defending the Environment: A
Strategy for Citizen Action, Sax lives up to his reputation.
The book is directed to anyone interested in protecting the
quality of the environment through legal controls. Its subtitle, 
"A
Strategy for Citizen Action," may be somewhat misleading 
to the
nonlegal book buyer. Sax's "citizen action" has nothing to 
do with
recycling, organizing citizen groups, or drafting petitions. 
The "ac-
tions" he advocates are legislative reforms and a heavier reliance 
on
the courts in guarding the environment. But he writes about 
his legal
topics in a clear, readable style that will appeal to nonlegal 
readers
as well as to those of the legal profession.
In his first two chapters, Sax illustrates the inadequacy of 
our
present system. His vehicle is the Hunting Creek case,' in 
which a
politically influential land company attempted to acquire and 
fill a
marsh area along the Potomac River for apartment sites. He 
covers
the strategies, politics, and administrative maneuvers on both 
sides
of the issue. The overwhelming impact of even slight political 
pres-
sure may be a revelation to anyone who has never been deeply 
in-
volved in environmental battles. It will sound depressingly 
familiar
to those who have.
Many of the circumstances may seem familiar, too. The 
story
begins with a request by developers for permission to acquire 
and
fill marsh land. The request was presented in an uncontested
hearing and approved without debate in the Virginia 
legislature.
Then a survey by the Department of the Interior's Fish and 
Wild-
life Service showed that the development would have an adverse 
ef-
fect on the environment. But Interior's position on the fate 
of the
1 Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
2 Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
B The lawsuit arising from this controversy was Fairfax County Fed'n 
v. Hunting
Towers Operating Co., Civil Action No. 4963A (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 1, 
1968).
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development depended more on politics than on environmental facts.Interior officials ignored their own study as they vacillated betweenopposition and approval. Their position on the matter changed threetimes before they finally opposed the development.
These first two chapters are a good initiation into the realities ofenvironmental battles. They should be required reading for anyjudge who is inclined to leave the environment to decisions by "gov-ernment agencies acting within their administrative discretion."
Sax then develops his argument for legislative reform. He usesthe Hunting Creek example and others to build a case showing thepotential values of court involvement and the weaknesses of thepresent system. He shows that the governmental agencies claiming torepresent the public interest have too often represented only them-selves when the environmental chips were down. Some agencies havenot only been indifferent to environmental threats, but at times haveeven opposed considering ecological values in their decisions. Thereality of political influence is confirmed by a revealing dialoguequoted from a congressional hearing:
MR. REUSS: If there were political considerations as the primarycause of the overruling of the Fish and Wildlife Service judgment, inyour opinion, is that good government?
DR. GOTTSCHALK: If we could put this on a hypothetical basis, Iwould be much more comfortable.
MR. REUSS: I want you to be comfortable. Let us put it on a hypo-thetical basis.
DR. GOTTSCHALK: I think there are undoubtedly situations whicharise which require the Secretary to trade one kind of achievement,
shall we say, for another.4
Sax's thesis is that "battles are best fought between those whohave direct stakes in the outcome."5 To remedy the failures ofagency decision-making, and to give the public the stake it needs,Sax advocates a change in the "balance of power."6 This is possible,he suggests, through liberalizing the rules of standing and establish-ing an environmental cause of action. His model statute describesthe cause of action in these terms.
Sec. 3. (1) When the plaintiff in the action has made a prima facieshowing that the conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to pollute,impair or destroy the air, water or other natural resources or the publictrust therein, the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the
4 J. Slu, DEiFENDiXG THEi ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 54(1971) (hereinafter referred to as SAx).
5 SAx, 56.
6 SAx, 61, 64.
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submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also show,
by way of an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible and prudent
alternative to defendant's conduct and that such conduct is consistent
with the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light 
of
the state's paramount concern for the protection of its natural resources
from pollution, impairment or destruction. .... 
7
The Michigan legislature 8 has adopted Sax's idea and several
other states are considering it. The Hart-McGovern bilP now pend-
ing in Congress contains much of Sax's proposal. California has not,
at this writing, adopted such a bill, but the prospects appear 
op-
timistic for a related proposal. S.B.678 (Lagomarsino) now before
the legislature would establish environmental causes of action 
to be
enforced by the California Attorney General.
I favor the institution of the Sax proposal on both the federal
and state levels. It can build legal incentives into our present system
without changing existing governmental organizations and without
additional expense. It allows judicial evaluation of the benefits and
the environmental risks of projects that may otherwise escape review
entirely. Projects are therefore more likely to be carefully planned.
However, I think that Professor Sax is in danger of overselling his
product. While he does occasionally qualify his optimistic predic-
tions," Sax nevertheless implies that adopting reform legislation will,
almost singlehandedly, initiate an era of ecological sanity. But, 
as
important as this legislation is, I suspect it may not be enough.
7 SAx, 250. The Model Statute also states:
Sec. 2. (1) The attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any
instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision 
thereof, any
person, partnership, corporation, association, organization 
or other legal entity
may maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction where the
alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory 
and equitable
relief against the state, any political subdivision thereof, 
any instrumentality
or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any 
person, partner-
ship, corporation, association, organization or other legal 
entity for the pro-
tection of the air, water and other natural resources and the public 
trust therein
from pollution, impairment or destruction.
Sec. 4. (1) The court may grant temporary and permanent equitable
relief, or may impose conditions on the defendant that are 
required to protect
the air, water and other natural resources or the public 
trust therein from
pollution, impairment or destruction....
Id. at 249, 250-51.
8 MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-02 (West Supp. 1971). But see Roberts v.
Michigan, Civil No. 12428-c (Mich. Ctr., May 4, 1971) where the 
court found that
part of the Act that authorizes the court to direct adoption 
of adequate standards, if it
finds state or local pollution standards to be deficient, 
is an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power, at least to the extent that it pertains 
to pollution arising from the
operation of motor vehicles.
9 S. 1032, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), (the "Hart-McGovern Bill") and 
companion
bill, H.R. 5076, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
10 See SAx, Chap. 11.
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Sax's arguments look convincing, but the selection and treat-
ment of his case examples may be misleading. In his examples of
cases where plaintiffs' standing was approved, the courts imposed
restraints protecting the environment. In other cases, where the
courts gave no protection, he concludes that results would have beendifferent if standing was more easily granted or if the law had al-lowed the courts to confront the environmental merits of the casedirectly. But "favorable" decisions are not necessarily evidence of
objective courts and "unfavorable" decisions are not all caused by
inadequate laws.
The list of cases in which courts have refused to protect the
environment is a long one. It is true that when plaintiffs objected todecisions of governmental agencies, the courts have often cited thesanctity of administrative discretion or the issue of standing as oneground, among others, for denying relief. But, in many cases, courtshave had a number of theories available which could have justified
a decision protecting long-term environmental or resource values,but chose not to use them. The judges have practiced the fine art ofdispensing justice as they saw it, and the availability of legal toolsto protect the environment has often had little or no impact. For
example, see the decisions in Sierra Club v. Hickel," U.S. v. FloridaPower," Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett," and theTongass National Forest case,' 4 in all of which the court refused to
order the requested relief. These opinions do not prove that the
courts are unreliable guardians of the environment, simply becausethe plaintiffs lost, but neither should Sax's examples be taken asproof that courts will always be protectors of the environment. Sax'sproposal could force some courts to deal with the environmental
merits in cases where they may have otherwise found judicially ac-
ceptable ways to avoid them. But, they may still avoid them, even
with Sax's law, if that is the route to justice from their viewpoint.Decisions will not uniformly protect the environment. The resultswill still be determined primarily by the equities at stake, the quality
of advocacy, the information presented to the court, and by the courtdecisions on procedural issues which are individually unimportant
but collectively controlling.
The quality of advocacy for plaintiffs in environmental caseshas been remarkably high up to this point. In the future, however, it
may not remain so. Moreover, if one relies primarily on court de-
cisions, one must accept the risks involved. For instance, counsel for
11 433 F.2d (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 907 (1971).12 U.S. v. Florida Power and Light Co., 311 F. Supp. 1391 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
13 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).14 Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 2 E.R.C. 1385 (D. Alaska, 1971).
[VCol. 1
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the defense will oftentimes be well compensated with adequate
funds for investigation, etc., while counsel for plaintiff will fre-
quently be operating on a minimal budget, sometimes even without
funds for adequate pre-trial studies.
Reliance on courts also assumes that all the important issues
will be brought before the courts. Conservation groups typically
have "bare bones" budgets and their lawsuits are no better financed.
In the past, they have invested their legal resources wisely and have
been rewarded with some highly significant precedents for their ef-
forts. Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that many important
cases go unlitigated even under the present law, because there are
not enough funds to cover the expenses of initiating a lawsuit. Some
agencies consistently fail to prepare National Environmental Policy
Act (hereafter N.E.P.A.)' 5 studies where the law requires them, be-
cause those agencies have calculated that they will not be taken 
to
court for their omission. It would be far better to develop more
comprehensive incentives within the system, than to entrust 
the
nationwide policing of environmental mismanagement to groups 
with
insufficient private funding. Another problem lies in the technical
expertise of the judges and juries. But Sax anticipates this.
6 He
claims that courts are never asked to resolve technical questions
7
and that the issue is a red herring.'
8 I disagree. One might examine
the record in Crowther v. Seaborg,'
9 where the issues confronting
the judge were as follows:
The ultimate issue of fact presented by these cases is whether the
proposed flaring of gas from the Rulison cavity will endanger life, health
and property of the plaintiffs or any other similarly situated, in 
con-
travention of the mandate of the Atomic Energy Act. In determining
this issue, five subsidiary issues have been raised by the parties 
and
must be disposed of. These are:
1. Do the Rulison plans make reasonably adequate provision for
the protection of the health and safety of human, plant and animal life?
2. Are these plans for flaring within the radiation protection stan-
dards of the AEC and the Federal Radiation Council (FRC)?
3. Are the defendants prepared and equipped to actually implement
the plans for flaring, thus insuring the protection of health and safety?
4. Are there safe economical alternatives to the proposed flaring
as a means of determining the effectiveness of the Rulison detonation?
5. Are the FRC and AEC radiation protection standards them-
selves adequate to protect life, health and property?
The above issues required the judge to evaluate conflicting technical
15 Publ. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (1970).
16 SAX, 150, 151.
17 SAX, 150.
18 SAX, 151.
19 312 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D. Colo. 1970).
1972]
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arguments on radiation hazards presented by highly trained nuclearphysicists. Their evidence had been the subject of sharp debate
within the nuclear science establishment. Imposing such decisions
on judges is asking and risking too much.
It is true, as Sax claims, that judges are used to confrontingtechnical arguments in many cases, including medical malpractice,
etc. But there is no assurance that judges have made the best de-cisions in those cases. While we urgently need objective decisions,
we also need expert decisions. That is most important in environ-
mental cases. In medical cases there is usually only one party affectedby a court's decision, and the only question is compensation for amedical event that has already occurred and about which the judge
can do nothing. A single decision in an environmental case mayliterally affect the health of millions of people. Perhaps a decision-
making institution of greater competence could be devised.
Apart from the fact that judges cannot be expected to be expertsin every area, there is also the problem that adequate informationfor making decisions may not be available. The only information
available to the courts is that brought before them by the parties. Inturn, this is information the parties have discovered from each other,that which their own experts can volunteer, or that revealed by en-vironmental studies required by law (such as N.E.P.A.). At present,
environmental studies are required only when projects involve fed-eral action, participation, or licensing,2" except in a few states wherethey are also required for state projects.2 ' But even when studieshave been performed, they have often avoided objective examination
of environmental issues. Incentives for objectivity are inadequate
since studies are usually conducted and conclusions drafted byparties interested in promoting the project under study, and, as inthe Hunting Creek case, administrators may ignore study results and
construe ambiguities to support predetermined conclusions.
Perhaps more serious is a lack of long-range information. Eventhe N.E.P.A. does not require complete long-range studies on allproblems which precipitate environmental crises. In cases notcovered by the N.E.P.A., the courts have even less material avail-
able. Consider the information required in deciding a dispute overthe location of a nuclear power plant. The court's decision is limitedin light of N.E.P.A. studies or other evidence on alternative sites.But the problem may not have arisen if there had been a decision
20 See Guidelines for Federal Agencies under the National Environmental PolicyAct, Council on Environmental Quality, April 23, 1971.21 For example, California has a new law requiring such studies in the Environ-
mental Quality Act of 1970. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21000 to 21151 (West Supp. 1971).
based on an objective study of the potential for other energy alterna-
tives or the possibility of reducing power demands by changing exist-
ing rate structures.
To make valuable long-range environmental decisions, we need
both better information and more objective decision-making institu-
tions. The courts can help (but not guarantee) only the latter. Sax's
solutions are a little like advocating a new surgery technique as a
cure-all for lung cancer. A better "cure" perhaps would be greater
prevention-and in the environmental context, that would mean
better information and timely, objective decisions.
While the ultimate protection will come only with a culture hold-
ing increased respect for the beauties of the earth and the hazards of
abusing its ecological fabric, in the interim we can design institutions
that will be more effective than those now in use. But until such in-
stitutions exist, the Sax proposal deserves support. It sharply focuses
the unique influences of the legal process (an objective decision-
maker with power to enforce its decisions) on envirnomental issues
which critically need that influence. We can then proceed to some-
thing better. Gary L. Widman*
ORGANIZING AND THE LAW. By Stephen I. Schlossberg and
Frederick E. Sherman. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Af-
fairs, Inc. 1971. Pp. 304. $10.00.
Every year there is virtually a publication bonanza of books
concerned with how to perform a variety of activities-the so called
"how to" books, e.g. Guptill's How to be a Pastor in a Mad, Mod
World; Greenberg's How to be a Jewish Mother; and Cuppy's How
to Become Extinct. The revised edition of Organizing and the Law
is in a sense a "how to" book, designed to provide union organizers
with some knowledge of labor law and thereby aid them in organiza-
tional drives for new union members. In simplified and readable
form, the book undertakes to set out major legal principles in the
labor law field affecting union organization.
The union organizer must be an amalgamation of many
specialized talents. Mainly, his goal is to achieve a union member-
* B.S. 1957, University of Nebraska; J.D. 1962, University of California, 
Hastings
College of the Law; LL.M. 1966, University of Michigan; 
Professor of Law and
Director, Resource and Environment Law Program, University 
of California, Hastings
College of the Law; Chairman, Subcommittee on New Institutions 
for Environment
Protection, American Bar Association.
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ship majority in a given unit of employees and to ultimately establish
a bargaining relationship between the union and the employer which
will culminate in the execution of a collective bargaining agreement.In the performance of this job, the organizer becomes inter alia asalesman, politician, psychologist, and lawyer. The job is a ruggedand demanding one. In certain parts of the country, union organiz-ing may still be fraught with physical dangers where the general
community and the specific employer entertain an overabundance
of hostility to the presence of unions and their organizational efforts.
The organizational drive is often a combat between an employerand the union, spearheaded by the organizer, for the minds, loyalty,
and votes of employees. The ground rules for contests between
employers and unions are provided in part by the National LaborRelations Board in decisions interpreting the National Labor Rela-tions Act and by various rules' developed therefrom. It is thereforeimperative that an ambitious union organizer have at a minimum afamiliarity with that aspect of labor law which may affect the successof his endeavor. In most cases, the organizer is not a lawyer, andthis book is not designed to provide him with the skills of a com-petent labor attorney. It will, however, supply him with valuable in-formation concerning the law's interplay with union organization andalert him to problems or situations where consulting a labor lawyer
would be advisable.
For example, in achieving employer recognition of the union asa bargaining representative, the organizer may find that he is takingthe election route, or, perhaps, the card route where the employer willgrant recognition upon the presentation of authorization cards signedby his employees without resorting to an election. In either event,the organizer's actions will be influenced by the Board's decisions inthese areas and the final accomplishment of his goal may be de-termined by his understanding of the significance of labor law. Thus,the book sets forth information with respect to authorization cards,how they should be worded, and how they may be used to achieve a
collective bargaining relationship.
The book also presents the reader with a fundamental knowledge
of employer unfair labor practices. It explains how these actions byan employer may be used to gain recognition without an election, or,as a basis for setting aside an election which the union has lost, pos-sibly because of the employer's unlawful behavior.' The bookstresses the importance of the organizer's awareness of unlawfulevents and his recordation of these incidents for future use by an
1 See 29 C.F.R. § 101.1-.43, 102.1-.134, 103.1 (1971).2 S. SCHLOSSBERG AND F. SHERmAN, ORGANIZING AND THE LAW 59 (rev. ed. 1971).
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attorney should there be an unfair labor practice case before the
Board.
Additional information and advice is offered concerning the
Board's entire representation procedure from the filing of a petition
for an election to certification of the union as the bargaining repre-
sentative.3 The organizer is cautioned, however, that the definition
of what the appropriate unit might be is critical for purposes of his
organizational campaign. Furthermore, if the employer has retained
counsel to present his evidence at a Board hearing, the union orga-
nizer may be under a handicap and should obtain counsel to eluci-
date the union's views.'
In addition to presenting what an organizer should do in specific
circumstances, the book also outlines some "don'ts" by describing
union unfair labor practices and warning union organizers about
possible activities which might run afoul of the law. Such complex
sections of the Act as Section 8(b)(7)5 are succinctly noted in
language comprehensible to laymen. The book also discusses prob-
lems in organization which may arise when the employees are repre-
sented by a union but are interested in changing to another union.
The authors of the book, Schlossberg and Sherman, are, respec-
tively, the General Counsel for the United Auto Workers and an
assistant professor of labor education at the University of Wisconsin.
They submit that the book is based on the simple premise that the
unionization of workers is a social and economic necessity. Their
purpose in writing the book is to eliminate some of the mysteries of
labor law for the union organizer and to thus accelerate unionization.
There is no doubt that the authors have created not only a valuable
handbook for union organizers in an understandable and usable
form, but have produced a book which any person interested in
acquiring a quick overview of labor law should find informative and
rewarding.
Herman M. Levy*
3 Id. at 283 et seq.
4 The size and composition of the unit decided upon at the hearing can well mean
the difference between victory or defeat for the union in an election.
5 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. IV, 1963).
* B.A. 1951, University of Pittsburgh; J.D. 1954, Harvard Law School; Diploma
In Law, 1968, Oxford University; Former Appellate Attorney, National Labor Relations
Board; Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Santa Clara.
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